In this paper we present an approach to defeasible reasoning for the description logic ALC. The results discussed here are based on work done by Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor (KLM) on defeasible conditionals in the propositional case. We consider versions of a preferential semantics for two forms of defeasible subsumption, and link these semantic constructions formally to KLM-style syntactic properties via representation results. In addition to showing that the semantics is appropriate, these results pave the way for more eective decision procedures for defeasible reasoning in description logics. With the semantics of the defeasible version of ALC in place, we turn to the investigation of an appropriate form of defeasible entailment for this enriched version of ALC. This investigation includes an algorithm for the computation of a form of defeasible entailment known as rational closure in the propositional case. Importantly, the algorithm relies completely on classical entailment checks and shows that the computational complexity of reasoning over defeasible ontologies is no worse than that of the underlying classical ALC. Before concluding, we take a brief tour of some existing work on defeasible extensions of ALC that go beyond defeasible subsumption. 5
formalisms, DLs do not allow for the proper representation of and reasoning with defeasible information, as shown up in the following example, adapted from Giordano et al. [39] : Students do not get tax invoices; employed students do; employed students who are also parents do not. From a naïve (classical) formalisation of this scenario, one concludes that the notion of employed student is an oxymoron, and consequently the concept of employed student is unsatisable.
A more nuanced view is to represent such statements as defeasible.
Endowing DLs with defeasible reasoning features is therefore a promising endeavour from the point of view of applications of knowledge representation and reasoning. Indeed, the past 25 years have witnessed many attempts to introduce defeasible reasoning capabilities in a DL setting, usually drawing on a well-established body of research on non-monotonic reasoning (NMR). These comprise the so-called preferential approaches [1921, 30, 32, 40, 44, 45, 57, 58, 63] and the circumscription-based ones [8, 9, 60] , amongst others [7, 36, 4648, 53, 56, 62] . Not surprisingly, Franz was among those who rst made a meaningful contribution in this regard [2, 3] .
Preferential extensions of DLs turn out to be particularly promising, mainly because they are based on an elegant, comprehensive and well-studied framework for non-monotonic reasoning in the propositional case proposed by Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor [49, 52] , often referred to as the KLM approach. Such a framework is valuable for a number of reasons. First, it provides for a thorough analysis of some formal properties that any consequence relation deemed as appropriate in a nonmonotonic setting ought to satisfy. Such formal properties play a central role in assessing how intuitive the obtained results are and enable a more comprehensive characterisation of the introduced non-monotonic conditional from a logical point of view. Second, the KLM approach allows for many decision problems to be reduced to classical entailment checking, sometimes without blowing up the computational complexity compared to the underlying classical case. Finally, it has a well-known connection with the AGM approach to belief revision [38, 59] and with frameworks for reasoning under uncertainty [6, 37] . It is therefore reasonable to expect that most, if not all, of the aforementioned features of the KLM approach should transfer to KLM-based extensions of DLs too.
Following the motivation laid out above, several extensions to the KLM approach to description logics have been proposed recently [19, 21, 23, 24, 27, 30, 32, 39, 40, 44, 45] , each of them investigating particular constructions and variants of the preferential approach. Here we provide an overview of the formal foundations of preferential defeasible reasoning in DLs. By that we mean (i ) providing a general and intuitive semantics; (ii ) showing that the corresponding representation results (in the KLM sense of the term) hold, linking the semantic constructions to the KLM-style set of properties, and (iii ) presenting an appropriate analysis of entailment in the context of ontologies with defeasible information with an associated decision procedure that is implementable.
After a brief introduction to the required background on the DL we consider here (in Section 2), we introduce the notion of defeasible subsumption along with a set of KLM-inspired properties it ought to satisfy (Section 3). In particular, using an intuitive semantics for the idea that usually, an element of the class C is also an element of the class D, we provide a characterisation (via representation results) of two important classes of defeasible statements, namely preferential and rational subsumption. In Section 4, we dicuss two obvious candidates for the notion of entailment in the context of defeasible DLs, namely preferential and modular entailment. These turn out not to have all properties seen as important in a non-monotonic DL setting, mimicking a similar feature in the propositional case [52] . This is followed in Section 5 by the presentation of a version of rational entailment satisfying all the required properties, and which can thus be seen as a suitable candidate for defeasible entailment. In Section 6 we discuss aspects of defeasible reasoning going beyond defeasible concept inclusion. We conclude in Section 7 with some pointers to research following on from the work presented here, and remarks on future related endeavours.
The overview presented in this paper relies heavily on research conducted by the present authors, et al. [15] .
Background
Description Logics (DLs) [1] are decidable fragments of rst-order logic with interesting properties and a variety of applications. There is a whole family of description logics, an example of which is ALC and on which we shall focus in the present paper. The (concept) language of ALC is built upon a nite set of atomic concept names C, a nite set of role names R and a nite set of individual names I such that C, R and I are pairwise disjoint. With A, B, . . . we denote atomic concepts, with r, s, . . . role names, and with a, b, . . . individual names. Complex concepts are denoted with C, D, . . . and are built according to the following rule:
With L we denote the language of all ALC concepts.
The semantics of L is the standard set theoretic Tarskian semantics. An interpretation is a structure I = def ∆ I , · I , where ∆ I is a non-empty set called the domain, and · I is an interpretation function mapping concept names A to subsets A I of ∆ I , role names r to binary relations r I over ∆ I , and individual names a to elements of the domain ∆ I , i.e.,
We extend the interpretation function · I to interpret complex concepts of L in the following way:
Given C, D ∈ L, C D is called a subsumption statement, or general concept inclusion (GCI). C ≡ D is an abbreviation for both C D and D C. An ALC TBox T is a nite set of GCIs. We denote subsumption statements with α, β, . . .
Given C ∈ L, r ∈ R and a, b ∈ I, an assertional statement (assertion, for short) is an expression of the form a : C or (a, b) : r. An ALC ABox A is a nite set of assertions. Given T and A, with KB = def T ∪ A we denote an ALC knowledge base, a.k.a. an ontology. This chapter focuses on defeasibility for description logic TBoxes only, and does not consider the extension to defeasible knowledge bases that include ABox statements. Various solutions for defeasible ABox reasoning have been proposed, that can be associated with the present approach for TBoxes [30, 29, 45, 35 ].
Defeasible concept inclusions
In a sense, class subsumption (alias concept inclusion) of the form C D is the main notion in DL ontologies. Given its implication-like intuition, subsumption lends itself naturally to defeasibility: provisionally, if an object falls under C, then it also falls under D, as in usually, students are tax exempted. In this respect, a defeasible version of concept inclusion is the starting point for an investigation of defeasible reasoning in DL ontologies. We also address defeasibility of the entailment relation in later sections. Denition 1 (Defeasible Concept Inclusion). Let C, D ∈ L. A defeasible concept inclusion axiom (DCI, for short) is a statement of the form C ∼ D.
A DCI of the form C ∼ D is to be read as usually, an instance of the class C is also an instance of the class D. For instance, the DCI Stud ∼ ¬∃receives.TaxInv formalises the example above. Paraphrasing Lehmann [50] , the intuition of C ∼ D is that if C were all the information about an object available to an agent, then D would be a sensible conclusion to draw about such an object. It is worth noting that ∼ , just as , is a`connective' positioned between the concept language (object level) and the meta-language (that of entailment) and it is meant to be the defeasible counterpart of the classical subsumption . 
In the semantic construction later on, it will also be useful to be able to refer to innite sets of concept inclusions. Let KB inf therefore denote a defeasible theory, dened as a defeasible knowledge base but without the restriction on T and D to nite sets.
In order to assess the behaviour of the new connective and check it against both the intuition and the set of properties usually considered in a non-monotonic setting, it is convenient to look at a set of ∼ -statements as a binary relation of the`antecedent-consequent' kind.
Denition 3 (Defeasible Subsumption Relation). A defeasible subsumption relation is a binary relation ∼ ⊆ L × L.
The idea is to mimic the analysis of defeasible entailment relations carried out by Kraus et al. [49] in the propositional case, where entailment is seen as a binary relation on the set in propositional sentences. Here we adopt the view of subsumption as a binary relation on concepts of our description language.
Sometimes (e.g. in the structural properties below) we write (C, D) ∈ ∼ in the inx notation, i.e., as C ∼ D. The context will make clear when we will be talking about elements of a relation or statements (DCIs) in a defeasible knowledge base.
Denition 4 (Preferential Subsumption Relation). A defeasible subsumption
relation ∼ is a preferential subsumption relation if it satises the following set of properties, which we refer to as (the DL versions of the) preferential KLM properties:
The properties in Denition 4 result from a translation of those for preferential consequence relations proposed by Kraus et al. [49] in the propositional setting.
They have been discussed at length in the literature for both the propositional and the DL cases [19, 21, 41, 42, 49, 52] and we shall not repeat so here.
If, in addition to the preferential properties above, the relation ∼ also satises rational monotonicity (RM) below, then it is said to be a rational subsumption relation:
Rational monotonicity is often considered a desirable property to have, one of the reasons stemming from the fact that it is a necessary condition for the satisfaction of the principle of presumption of typicality (more on that in Section 4).
In what follows, we present a semantics for preferential and rational subsumption by enriching standard DL interpretations I with an ordering on the elements of the domain ∆ I . The intuition underlying this is simple and natural, and extends similar work in the propositional case by Shoham [ Denition 5 (Preferential Interpretation). A preferential interpretation is a tuple P = def ∆ P , · P , ≺ P , where ∆ P , · P is a (standard) DL interpretation (which we denote by I P and refer to as the classical interpretation associated with P), and ≺ P is a strict partial order on ∆ P (i.e., ≺ P is irreexive and transitive) satisfying the smoothness condition (for every C ∈ L, if C P = ∅, then min ≺ P C P = ∅). 6
Preferential interpretations provide us with a simple and intuitive way to give a semantics to DCIs.
Denition 6 (Satisfaction). Let P be a preferential interpretation and let C, D ∈ L. The satisfaction relation is dened as follows:
If P α, then we say P satises α. P satises a defeasible knowledge base KB, written P KB, if P α for every α ∈ KB, in which case we say P is a preferential model of KB. We say C ∈ L is satisable w.r.t. KB if there is
It is easy to see that the addition of the ≺ P -component preserves the truth of all classical subsumption statements holding in the remaining structure: Lemma 1. Let P be a preferential interpretation. For every C, D ∈ L, P C D if and only if I P C D.
It is worth noting that, due to the smoothness of ≺ P , every (classical) subsumption statement is equivalent, with respect to preferential interpretations, to some DCI.
Lemma 2. For every preferential interpretation P, and every C, D ∈ L, P C D if and only if P C ¬D ∼ ⊥.
An obvious question that can now be raised is: How do we know our preferential semantics provides an appropriate meaning to the notion of DCI? The following denition will help us in answering this question:
Denition 7 (P-Induced Defeasible Subsumption). Let P be a preferential interpretation.
The rst important result we present here, which also answers the above raised question, shows that there is a full correspondence between the class of preferential subsumption relations and the class of Theorem 1 (Representation Result for Preferential Subsumption). A defeasible subsumption relation ∼ ⊆ L × L is preferential if and only if there is a preferential interpretation P such that ∼ P = ∼ .
What is perhaps surprising about this result is that no additional properties based on the syntactic structure of the underlying DL are necessary to characterise the defeasible subsumption relations induced by preferential interpretations.
In addition to preferential interpretations, we are also interested in the study of modular interpretations, which are preferential interpretations in which the ≺-component is a modular ordering:
Denition 8 (Modular Order). Given a set X, ≺ ⊆ X × X is modular if it is a strict partial order, and its associated incomparability relation ∼, dened by x ∼ y if neither x ≺ y nor y ≺ x, is transitive.
Intuitively, modular interpretations allow us to compare any two objects w.r.t. their plausibility. Those that are incomparable are viewed as being equally plausible. As such, modular interpretations are special cases of the preferential ones, where plausibility can be represented by any smooth strict partial order.
The main reason to consider modular interpretations is that they provide the semantic foundation of rational subsumption relations. This is made precise by our second important result below, which shows that the defeasible subsumption It is worth pausing for a moment to emphasise the signicance of these two results (Theorems 1 and 2). They provide exact semantic characterisations of two important classes of defeasible subsumption relations, namely preferential and rational subsumption, in terms of the classes of preferential and modular interpretations, respectively. As we shall see in Section 4, these results form the core of the investigation into an appropriate form of entailment for defeasible DL ontologies.
Defeasible entailment
From the standpoint of knowledge representation and reasoning, a pivotal question is that of deciding which statements are entailed by a knowledge base. In the present section we lay out the formal foundations for that.
Preferential entailment
In the exploration of a notion of entailment for defeasible ontologies, an obvious starting point is to consider a Tarskian denition of consequence:
Denition 10 (Preferential Entailment). A statement α is preferentially entailed by a defeasible knowledge base KB, written KB |= pref α, if every preferential model of KB satises α.
As usual, this form of entailment is accompanied by a corresponding notion of closure.
Denition 11 (Preferential Closure). Let KB be a defeasible knowledge base. With KB * pref = def {α | KB |= pref α} we denote the preferential closure of KB.
Intuitively, the preferential closure of a defeasible knowledge base KB corresponds to the`core' set of statements, classical and defeasible, that should hold given those in KB. Hence, preferential entailment and preferential closure are two sides of the same coin, mimicking an analogous result for preferential reasoning in both the propositional [49] and the DL [16, 21] cases.
Recall (cf. the discussion following Denition 2) that a defeasible theory KB inf is a defeasible knowledge base without the restriction to nite sets. When assessing how appropriate a notion of entailment for defeasible ontologies is, the following denitions turn out to be useful, as will become clear in the sequel:
So, the dTBox induced by KB inf is the set of defeasible subsumption statements contained in KB inf , together with the defeasible versions of the classical subsumption statements in KB inf . The defeasible subsumption relation induced by KB inf is simply the defeasible subsumption relation corresponding to D KB inf . relation induced by it satises the preferential properties in Denition 4.
It turns out that the defeasible subsumption relation induced by the preferential closure of a defeasible knowledge base KB is exactly the intersection of the defeasible subsumption relations induced by the preferential defeasible theories containing KB. Lemma 3. Let KB be a defeasible knowledge base. Then
It follows immediately that the preferential closure of a defeasible knowledge base KB is preferential, and induces the smallest defeasible subsumption relation induced by a preferential defeasible theory containing KB.
Preferential entailment is not always desirable, one of the reasons being that it is monotonic, courtesy of the Tarskian notion of consequence it relies on (see Denition 10) . In most cases, as witnessed by the great deal of work in the nonmonotonic reasoning community, a move towards rationality is in order. Thanks to the denitions above and the result in Theorem 2, we already know where to start looking for it. 
That is, the modular closure of a defeasible knowledge base KB induces the smallest defeasible subsumption relation induced by a rational defeasible theory containing KB. However, the modular closure of KB is not necessarily rational.
That is, if one looks at the set of statements (in particular the ∼ -ones) modularly entailed by a knowledge base as a defeasible subsumption relation, then it need not satisfy the RM property. This is so because modular entailment coincides with preferential entailment, as the following result, adapted from a well-known similar result in the propositional case [52, Theorem 4.2], shows.
Hence, modular entailment unfortunately falls short of providing us with an appropriate notion of defeasible entailment. In what follows, we overcome precisely this issue.
Rational entailment
We now present a denition of semantic entailment which is appropriate in the light of the discussion above. The constructions we are going to present are inspired by the semantic characterisation of rational closure by Booth and Paris [13] in the propositional case.
We start by focusing our attention on a subclass of modular orders, referred to as ranked orders: Denition 17 (Ranked Order). Given a set X, the binary relation ≺ ⊆ X × X is a ranked order if there is a mapping h R : X −→ N satisfying the following convexity property:
and such that for every
It is easy to see that a ranked order ≺ is also modular: ≺ is a strict partial order, and, since two objects x, y are incomparable (i.e., x ∼ y) if and only if h R (x) = h R (y), ∼ is a transitive relation. By constraining our preference relations to the ranked orders, we can identify a subset of the modular interpretations we refer to as the ranked interpretations. Denition 18 (Ranked Interpretation). A ranked interpretation is a
We now provide two basic results about ranked interpretations. First, all nite modular interpretations are ranked interpretations.
Lemma 6. A modular interpretation
Next, for every ranked interpretation, the function h R is unique. Proposition 1. Given a ranked interpretation R = ∆ R , · R , ≺ R , there is only one function h R : ∆ R −→ N satisfying the convexity property and s.t. for every
Proposition 1 allows us to use the function h R (·) to dene the notions of height and layers. Denition 19 (Height & Layers) . Let R = ∆ R , · R , ≺ R be a ranked interpretation with characteristic ranking function h R (·). Given an object
Intuitively, the lower the height of an object in an interpretation R, the more typical (or normal) the object is in R. We can also think of a level of typicality for concepts: the height of a concept C ∈ L in R is the index of the layer to which the restriction of the concept's extension to its ≺ R -minimal elements belong, i.e.,
Given a set of ranked interpretations, we can introduce a new form of model merging, ranked union. Denition 20 (Ranked Union). Given a countable set of ranked interpretations
, the disjoint union of the domains from R, where each R ∈ R has the elements x, y, . . . of its domain renamed as x R , y R , . . . so that they are all distinct in ∆ R ;
The latter condition corresponds to imposing that
The following lemma will be useful in what follows. The following result shows that the set Mod ∆ (KB) suces to characterise modular entailment:
Therefore, we can use just the set of interpretations in Mod ∆ (KB) to decide the consequences of KB w.r.t. modular entailment.
We can now use the set Mod ∆ (KB) as a springboard to introduce what will turn out to be a canonical modular interpretation for KB. Using Mod ∆ (KB) and ranked union we can dene the following relevant model. 
the ranked union of the models in Mod ∆ (KB).
Since ranked interpretations are closed under ranked unions (Lemma 7), we can state the following:
Armed with the denitions and results above, we are now ready to provide an alternative denition of entailment in the context of defeasible ontologies:
That such a notion of entailment indeed deserves its name is witnessed by the following result, a consequence of Lemma 9 and Theorem 2: Corollary 1. Let KB be a defeasible knowledge base and O its big ranked model.
We shall see below that this form of entailment corresponds to the DL version of a well-known form of propositional defeasible entailment [52] .
In conclusion, rational entailment is a good candidate for the appropriate notion of consequence we have been looking for. Of course, a question that arises is whether a notion of closure, in the spirit of preferential and modular closures, that is equivalent to it can be dened. In the next section, we address precisely this matter.
Rational closure for defeasible knowledge bases
We now turn our attention to the exploration, in a DL setting, of the wellknown notion of rational closure of a defeasible knowledge base as studied by Lehmann and Magidor [52] . For the most part, we shall base the presentation of the constructions on the work by Casini and Straccia [30, 32] , amending it wherever necessary. An alternative semantic characterisation of rational closure in DLs has also been proposed by Giordano et al. [44, 45] ; their characterisation and the one we present here are equivalent [35, Appendix A].
As we shall see, rational closure provides a proof-theoretic characterisation of rational entailment and the complexity of its computation is no higher than that of computing entailment in the underlying classical DL.
Rational closure and a correspondence result
Rational closure is a form of inferential closure based on modular entailment |= mod , but it extends its inferential power. Such an extension of modular entailment is obtained by formalising the already mentioned principle of presumption of typicality [51, Section 3.1] . That is, under possibly incomplete information, we always assume that we are dealing with the most typical possible situation that is compatible with the information at our disposal. We rst dene what it means for a concept to be exceptional, a notion that, as we shall see, is central to the denition of rational closure: Denition 23 (Exceptionality). Let KB be a defeasible knowledge base and
A concept C is considered exceptional in a knowledge base KB if it is not possible to have a modular model of KB in which there is a typical object (i.e., an object at least as typical as all the others) that is in the interpretation of C. Intuitively, a DCI is exceptional if it does not concern the most typical objects, i.e., it is about less normal (or exceptional) ones. This is an intuitive translation of the notion of exceptionality used by Lehmann and Magidor [52] in the propositional framework, and has already been used by Casini and Straccia [30] and Giordano et al. [45] in their investigations into defeasible reasoning for DLs.
Applying the notion of exceptionality iteratively, we associate with every concept C a rank in KB, which we denote by rank KB (C). We extend this to DCIs and associate with every statement C ∼ D a rank, denoted rank KB (C ∼ D): 4. By iterating the previous steps, we eventually reach a subset E ⊆ D such that all the DCIs in E are exceptional (since D is nite, we must reach such a point). If E = ∅, we dene the rank of the DCIs in E as ∞, and the set E is denoted D rank ∞ .
The notion of rank can also be extended to GCIs as follows: rank KB (C D) = rank KB (C). Following on the procedure above, D is partitioned into a nite sequence D rank 0 , . . . , D rank n , D rank ∞ (n ≥ 0), where D rank ∞ may possibly be empty. So, through this procedure we can assign a rank to every DCI.
It is easy to see that for a concept C to have a rank of ∞ corresponds to not being satisable in any model of KB, that is, KB |= mod C ⊥. 
2. C D is in the rational closure of KB if rank KB (C ¬D) = ∞.
Informally, the denition above says that the DCI C ∼ D is in the rational closure of KB if the modular models of KB tell us that some instances of C D are more plausible than all instances of C ¬D, while the GCI C D is in the rational closure of KB if the instances of C ¬D are impossible. The attentive reader will note that this denition has some similarity with the epistemic entrenchment orderings used in belief revision [38, 59] Theorem 3. Let KB be a defeasible knowledge base having a modular model. A statement α is in the rational closure of KB i KB |= rat α.
An easy corollary of this result is that rational closure preserves the equivalence between GCIs (of the form C D) and their defeasible counterparts (C ¬D ∼ ⊥). 
Rational entailment checking
We now present an algorithm to eectively check the rational entailment of a DCI from a defeasible knowledge base. Our algorithm is based on the one given by Casini and Straccia [30] for defeasible ALC.
Let KB = T ∪ D be a defeasible knowledge base. The rst step of the algorithm is to assign a rank to each DCI in D. Central to this step is the exceptionality function Exceptional(·), which computes the semantic notion of exceptionality of Denition 23. Given a set of DCIs D ⊆ D, Exceptional(T , D ) returns a subset E of D such that E is exceptional w.r.t. T ∪ D . 
Function Exceptional(T , D )
18 return KB * = T * ∪ D * , R
We initialise T * to T and D * to D (Lines 1 and 2 of ComputeRanking). We then repeatedly invoke the function Exceptional to obtain a sequence of sets of DCIs E 0 , E 1 , . . ., where E 0 = D * and each E i+1 is the set of exceptional axioms in E i (Lines 414 of ComputeRanking(·)). Now, let C D * = def {C | C ∼ D ∈ D * }, i.e., C D * is the set of all antecedents of DCIs in D * . The exceptionality ranking of the DCIs in D * computed by Exceptional(·) makes use of T * , D * , and C D * . That is, it checks, for each concept C ∈ C D * , whether T * |= D * ¬C. In case C is exceptional, every DCI C ∼ D ∈ D * is exceptional w.r.t. KB * = T * ∪ D * and is added to the set E 1 .
If E 1 = E 0 , then we call Exceptional(·) for T * ∪ E 1 , dening the set E 2 , and so on. Hence, given KB * = T * ∪ D * , we construct a sequence E 0 , E 1 , . . . in the following way, for i ≥ 0: Since D * is nite, the construction will eventually terminate with a xed point E fix = Exceptional(T * , E fix ). If this xed point is non-empty, then the axioms in there are said to have innite rank. We therefore set D * ∞ as E fix (Line 11 of ComputeRanking(·)), and the classical translations of these axioms are moved to the TBox. Hence we redene the knowledge base in the following way (Lines 12 and 13 of ComputeRanking(·)):
Function ComputeRanking(·) must terminate since D is nite, and at every iteration, D * becomes smaller (hence, we have at most |D| iterations). In the end, we obtain a knowledge base KB * = T * ∪ D * which is modularly equivalent to the original knowledge base KB = T ∪ D (see Lemma 12 below) , in which D * has no DCIs of innite rank (all the strict knowledge`hidden' in the dTBox has been moved to the TBox). In the following, we say that such a knowledge base is in rank normal form.
Once we have obtained the knowledge base KB * = T * ∪ D * and the nal sequence E 0 , E 1 , . . . , E fix , we partition the set D * into the sets D 0 , . . . , D n , for some n ≥ 0 (Lines 1517 of ComputeRanking(·)). Example 2. (continued) For KB as in Example 2, we obtain the sequence:
At this stage, we have moved all the classical information possibly`hidden' inside the dTBox to the TBox, and ranked all the remaining DCIs, where the rank of a DCI is the index of the unique partition to which it belongs, dened as follows:
Denition 26 (Ranking). For every C, D ∈ L:
To summarise, we transform our initial knowledge base KB = T ∪D, obtaining a modularly equivalent knowledge base KB * = T * ∪ D * (see Lemma 12 below) and a ranking of DCIs in the form of a partitioning of D * . The main dierence between ComputeRanking(·) and the analogous procedure by Casini and Straccia [30] is the reiteration of the ranking procedure until D * ∞ = ∅ (lines 4-14 in ComputeRanking(·)).
While the two procedures behave identically in the case where there are no DCIs C ∼ D s.t. rank KB (C ∼ D) = ∞ in D, the original procedure [30] did not handle all the cases correctly in which there is strict information`hidden' inside the dTBox.
Given the knowledge base KB * = T * ∪ D * , we can now dene the main algorithm for deciding whether a DCI C ∼ D is in the rational closure of KB.
To do that, we use the same approach as in the function Exceptional(·), that is, given KB * = T * ∪ D * and our sequence of sets E 0 , . . . , E n , we use the TBox T * and the sets of conjunctions of materialisations E 0 , . . . , E n . Denition 27 (Rational Deduction). Let KB = T ∪D and let C, D ∈ L. We Finally, we can conrm that T * |= E i C D, i.e., {EmpStud Stud} |= (¬EmpStud ∃receives.TaxInv) (¬EmpStud ¬Parent ¬∃receives.TaxInv) EmpStud ∃receives.TaxInv.
Before we state the main theorem of this section, we need to establish the correspondence between the ranking function rank KB (·) presented in Section 5.1 in the construction of the rational closure of KB and linked by Theorem 3 to the denition of rational entailment, and the ranking function rk(·) of Denition 26 used in the above algorithm. We also need to establish that the normalisation of a knowledge base by our algorithm maintains modular equivalence. Lemma 12. Let KB = T ∪ D and let KB * = T * ∪ D * be obtained from KB through function ComputeRanking(·). Then KB and KB * are modularly equivalent. As an immediate consequence, we have that the function RationalClosure(·) is correct w.r.t. the denition of rational closure in Denition 24. Corollary 3. Checking rational entailment is exptime-complete.
Hence entailment checking for defeasible ontologies is just as hard as classical subsumption checking.
We conclude this section by noting that although rational closure is viewed as an appropriate form of defeasible reasoning, it does have its limitations, the rst of which is that it does not satisfy the presumption of independence [51, Section 3.1] . To consider a well-worn example, suppose we know that birds usually y and usually have wings, that both penguins and robins are birds, and that penguins usually do not y. That is, we have the following knowledge base: KB = {Bird ∼ Flies, Bird ∼ Wings, Penguin Bird, Robin Bird, Penguin ∼ ¬Flies}.
Rational closure allows us to conclude that robins usually have wings, since they are viewed as typical birds, thereby satisfying the presumption of typicality.
But with penguins being atypical birds, rational closure does not allow us to conclude that penguins usually have wings, thus violating the presumption of independence which, in this context, would require the atypicality of penguins w.r.t. ying to be independent of the typicality of penguins w.r.t. having wings.
This deciency is well-known, and there are other forms of defeasible reasoning that can overcome this, most notably lexicographic closure [31] , relevance closure [33] , and inheritance-based closure [34, 32] . But note that the presumption of independence is propositional in nature. In fact, the DL version of lexicographic closure is essentially a lifting to the DL case of a propositional solution to the problem [51] .
What is perhaps of more interest is the inability of rational closure to deal with defeasibility relating to the non-propositional aspects of descriptions logics.
For example, Pensel and Turhan [54, 55] 
Beyond defeasible concept inclusion
Defeasible reasoning in description logics extends beyond defeasible concept inclusion. In this section, we outline two such extensions following on from the work presented here, rstly to account for named individuals in defeasible knowledge bases, and secondly to introduce defeasible class descriptions.
The introduction of defeasible reasoning also for ABox reasoning is a necessary extension of the results we have presented in this chapter. We want to be able to derive assertions of the kind Presumably, the individual a falls under the concept C, and, in the present framework, the natural way of doing it would be to model the presumption of typicality also w.r.t. the individuals named in the ABox, that is, to maximise the amount of defeasible information we associate with each individual: If all we know about Ann is that she is a student, we want to be able to conclude that presumably Ann does not get a tax invoice. The main technical problem in the present framework is the possibility of having multiple distinct congurations that maximise the presumption of typicality w.r.t. the individuals [30, Example 7] . Dierent solutions have been proposed [30, 55, 45, 29, 35] , but, as mentioned in Section 2, we are not going to introduce here the dierent proposals regarding the introduction of defeasible reasoning for the ABox.
The systems proposed by Giordano and others [39, 40, 44, 45] introduce an operator T (typical ) associated to the concepts. This allows extra expressivity in modelling defeasible information: an inclusion like Stud ¬∃receives.TaxInv T(Stud), indicating that the students that do not receive the a tax invoice must be considered typical students, is not expressible in a language using only defeasible subsumptions. However, in most of the systems they introduce, T can be used only in expressions of the form T(C) D, which is interpreted exctly as an expression C ∼ D. Booth and others [10] have shown that, even at the propositional level, using freely an operator like T creates the possibility of multiple congurations satisfying the presumption of typicality, in a way that, from the formal point of view, is analogous to the problem registered working with the ABoxes.
Given the special status of subsumption in DLs in particular and the historical importance of argument forms and entailment in logic in general, the bulk of the eort in non-monotonic reasoning has quite naturally been spent on the denition of a proper account of defeasible subsumption and the characterisation of appropriate notions of defeasible entailment. However, given the importance of concept descriptions in DLs, an extension of this work to also represent defeasible classes is called for. This includes the ability to represent notions such as plausible value or existential restrictions in complex concept descriptions [17, 23, 24, 27] . There are several ways to accomplish this, and we focus here on one such proposal. We could, for example, ask whether the constraint that workers usually have bosses as their superior is necessarily correctly captured by the defeasible subsumption: Worker ∼ ∃hasSuperior.Boss. An alternative reading of the phrase is that all workers have some superior, who is usually a boss. It is therefore the class description ∃hasSuperior.Boss which is defeasible. rather than the subsumption statement. This can be captured by extending the concept language of ALC as follows:
C ::= | ⊥ | C | ¬C | C C | C C | ∀r.C | ∃r.C | ∼ r.C | − ∼ − | r.C With L we denote the extended language of all (possibly defeasible) ALC concepts.
Denition 28. Let P = ∆ P , · P , ≺ P be a preferential interpretation. Let r ∈ R and C ∈ C. The truth conditions for defeasible universal restriction ∼ r.C and strict existential restriction − ∼ − | r.C are given by:
That − ∼ − | r.C captures the notion of strict existential restriction follows since, not only does the semantics require that some r-ller be in C P , but it also demands that some most preferred r-ller be in C P . In contrast, defeasible universal (value) restriction relaxes the condition that all r-llers be in C P , requiring only that all most preferred r-llers be in C P .
Denition 28 now allows us to state that every worker has some typical superior who is a boss, i.e., Worker − ∼ − | hasSuperior.Boss, or that any superior of a worker is usually a boss, i.e., Worker ∼ hasSuperior.Boss.
The defeasible quantiers of Denition 28 are based on a single order on objects, but this generalises naturally to a parameterised ordering on either objects or role interpretations [23, 27] , the details of which we omit here. The ramications of extending the language with defeasible quantication have also been investigated for modal logics, where it assumes the form of defeasible modalities [25, 26] .
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have provided an overview of a specic approach to defeasible reasoning one that is based on work initiated by Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor for the propositional case [49, 52] . This approach has a number of attractive characteristics: It has a simple and intuitive semantics for defeasible subsumption in description logics that is general enough to constitute the core framework within which to investigate defeasible extensions to DLs. It also allows for the characterisation of two forms of defeasible subsumption relations preferential and rational subsumption providing weight to the claim that the semantic constructions are intuitively appropriate. In addition, it provides the basis for dening an appropriate form of defeasible entailment a description logic version of what is known as rational closure in the propositional case. Moreover, it comes equipped with an algorithm for computing the DL version of rational closure with computational complexity that is no worse than the complexity of entailment checking in ALC. Importantly from a practical perspective, the algorithm can be reduced to a number of classical entailment checks, which means that it can be implemented on top of existing (highly optimised) description logic reasoners. In terms of performance, a relatively naïve version of such an algorithm has already been shown to scale well in practice [28] . Section 6 touched on some ways in which defeasible reasoning for description logics has already been extended beyond defeasible concept inclusion, but all these proposals are only preliminary investigations with much work that still needs to be done. Further topics for future research include the study of rolebased defeasible constructors [23, 24, 27] and the investigation of defeasible versions of query answering [64] . Finally, a somewhat dierent area for future exploration is one that is aimed at exploiting the well-known connection between belief revision and rational consequence in the propositional case [38] . Given this connection on the propositional level, it seems reasonable to expect that the results presented in this paper can form the basis of a dierent perspective on belief revision for description logics.
